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MEMORANDUM FOR: Project Director

SUBJECT : TALENT/AQUATONE Security Problems

1. As you have noted in recent Ad Hoc Requirements Committee Minutes and my draft paper on this subject which we discussed orally, groups of TALENT users who need some aspects of operational information have been identified:

- a. Category A. PIs and technical photo advisers to ARC members.
- b. Category B. ELINT processors, selected ELINT analysts, and technical ELINT advisers to ARC members.
- c. Category C. COMINT processors and those who are working on all source analysis in certain regards.
- d. Category D. ARC members, their alternates, and requirements advisers.

2. All of the foregoing may in the course of their business almost surely be exposed to or will require the following minimum types of operational data:

- a. Altitude.
- b. Time.

TALENT
CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY

c. Track.

d. Range.

In addition, those who work directly in the ARC need or are likely to become exposed to information as follows:

e. Base locations.

f. Processing centers (ELINT or photographic) in the ZI or abroad,

g. Weather areas (incident to providing intelligence guidance for Operations' planning).

3. There are other categories of Government officials with a TALENT clearance who are not engaged in direct exploitation of TALENT materials but who may need to know that the product exists, its quality and reliability, or its potential. These fall into roughly two categories:

a. High level supervisory personnel in all agencies (Generals, Admirals, etc.) and

b. Research and Development personnel.

4. Up to the present, procedure for an AQUATONE clearance among TALENT users calls for the submission of a written statement of need to the CIA TCO who forwards the request to the Project Security Officer with a recommendation along with the name, date and place of

birth, serial number, and date TOP SECRET clearance granted. Thereupon, the Project Security Officer inspects the security file as well as certain specialized files. The delays incident to this procedure have been extensive and understandably so. A proposal for solving our TALENT/AQUATONE problem, set forth below, embraces a method for eliminating this bottleneck.

5. Before putting forth this proposal, it should also be pointed out that there does not appear to be any workable scheme for exercising mechanical control of different degrees of operational information among the various items of such information identified in the preceding paragraphs. The only effective means of restricting information among those with proper certification lies in the faithful application of the need to know or the must know principle. We have already sought to educate those in the TALENT system to this principle, and the evidence is that TALENT certified personnel are living up to that injunction.

Proposal

6. Each agency's TALENT Control Officer should forward to CIA TCO requests for certification for access to operational information with the following:

a. Types of operational information required.

b. Function for which such information is essential.

c. Full name, date and place of birth, serial number,

list and date of clearances held, statement of full field investigation with date.

7. Upon receipt of the above request, the CIA TCO would forward the request to the Project Security Officer with his endorsement.

8. If the Project Security Officer finds the request in good order, he will promptly sign on the line "Approved for Certification".

9. Upon the prompt return of this paper to the originating TALENT Control Officer, he would have the individual sign a statement of certification for code word information (e.g., "CHECKERS"), representing the authorization to access to operational information on a must know basis. This certification would be listed on a roster maintained by the CIA TSO (where there is already a repository for the names of personnel cleared into the TALENT system wherever organizationally or physically located) as well as with the Project Security Officer.

Comment: The Foregoing will have the effect of requiring the same standards for clearance for Project information as are now applicable in the case of TALENT clearances. The standards for TALENT clearances are equal to those required for Special

Intelligence. Each TCO or TSO for each agency or unit of organization or the CIA TSO will be immediately capable of identifying upon request whether Mr. Jones, for example, is certified for operational information, keeping in mind that the extent of such information he may have is based upon the fact that he must know it. It should also be noted that the SI and SS security systems, as well as the TALENT, follow this decentralized security clearance procedure.

10. The Project Security Officer, having approved a request for an individual's CHECKERS certification, may now, as he does today, proceed to obtain any and all security files or information. Should he find derogatory information, he is in a position to raise the issue to have the party debriefed if necessary or to take other action which may be called for. This is what the Project Security Officer in certain instances may have to do under current procedures because on a number of occasions the need for an AQUATONE clearance is so pressing as to not permit the full exploration of all files prior to granting of clearance.

11. All documentation or materials which reveal operational information as specified by the Project will now be labelled by a code word (for illustration at the moment: CHECKERS). In some cases when such materials enter the TALENT system they will be labelled "HANDLE VIA TALENT CONTROL SYSTEM". Where the document includes Special

material be the product of AQUATONE in a penetration mission it will be labelled CHESS.

(The foregoing is not to suggest that within Operations operational information be handled any differently from at present for that is an internal Project problem.)

12. Under the foregoing proposals, it should be understood that proper handling of CHECKERS material will require that clerical and secretarial personnel in TALENT centers where the material moves will have to be certified although they will have no must know for the contents even as is true today in TALENT matters among couriers, secretaries, clerical and commo personnel.

13. Recommendation: That the proposal set forth above in paragraphs 6 through 12 be approved and that procedures for the implementation of these proposals within the TALENT system be immediately worked out and applied by the CIA TCO in consultation with the Project Security Officer, the TALENT Security Officer, and the agencies participating in ARC.

JAMES Q. REBER
Chairman
Ad Hoc Requirements Committee

JQR:cw